NOTICE OF INTENDED APPEAL AND SERIOUS PUBLIC-INTEREST CONCERNS

September 1 2026

BY EMAIL

Andrea Burke, Chair
Jane Waechter, Adjudicator
Dale R. Ponder, Adjudicator
Capital Markets Tribunal

Re: Marks v. CNSX Markets Inc., 2026 ONCMT 30 — Tribunal File No. 2025-11

Dear Members of the Panel:

I am writing to provide formal notice that I intend to appeal the Tribunal’s August 28, 2026 decision to the Ontario Divisional Court and to pursue any other review rights available to me. I will contend that the decision represents a profound miscarriage of administrative justice and a failure to protect the public interest.

This was never merely a private dispute between one individual and the Canadian Securities Exchange. The CSE’s conduct led directly to the November 13, 2024 trading halt of New World Solutions Inc., a public company with approximately 4,000 shareholders, including at least 1,500 Ontario residents. Those shareholders suffered losses measured in the millions of dollars, while the company’s United States-traded securities lost approximately 98% to 99% of their value.

The Tribunal nevertheless treated the matter principally as a narrow dispute about my personal suitability. It failed to investigate the underlying cause of the trading halt, failed to confront the absence of the contemporaneous decision-making record, refused material evidence bearing directly on potential CSE wrongdoing, and then supplied a new rationale for deeming me unsuitable that was not grounded in any identified statute, regulation, CSE rule, or established suitability standard.

The result is a travesty of administrative justice. A recognized exchange was permitted to exercise extraordinary public-market power without producing the basic evidence showing when, why, or by whom its decision was actually made. The investors harmed by that conduct were left without answers, accountability, or an effective remedy.

1. THE TRIBUNAL FAILED TO ADDRESS THE CAUSE OF THE TRADING HALT AND THE HARM TO APPROXIMATELY 4,000 INVESTORS

The sequence of events was central:

• On September 3, 2024, the CSE approved the New World Solutions/Dial MKT Corp. transaction.
• The transaction closed on September 11, 2024, and I became chairman and a disclosed substantial shareholder.
• My Personal Information Form and involvement were confirmed in September 2024.
• The CSE allowed the transaction to close with full knowledge of my role and ownership.
• On November 13, 2024, the CSE halted trading and demanded that the completed transaction effectively be unwound.

The suitability position taken against me was therefore not an abstract personnel issue. It was the instrument that caused or materially contributed to the halt, destroyed market liquidity, impaired New World’s business and acquisition prospects, and inflicted losses on thousands of investors who had never been heard.

A public-interest tribunal should have begun with the obvious question: how did a transaction approved by the CSE, after disclosure of my identity, ownership, and proposed role, become unacceptable only after it had closed and public investors had placed their capital at risk?

The Tribunal did not answer that question. It did not meaningfully analyze whether the CSE’s own approvals, subsequent reversal, and shifting explanations caused the investor harm. Nor did it require the CSE to explain why any alleged promotional concerns—conduct the CSE says it had known about as early as 2022—were not raised before approving the transaction.

The public-interest dimension made this more than a conventional individual review application. A decision affecting approximately 4,000 shareholders and millions of dollars demanded a full examination of the underlying regulatory conduct. The Tribunal’s failure to undertake that examination was not a minor omission. It went to the heart of its statutory public-interest responsibility.

2. THE MISSING CONTEMPORANEOUS EMAILS AND THE REFUSAL TO ADMIT MATERIAL NEW EVIDENCE

The purported January 8 suitability decision or memorandum was central to the CSE’s case. Yet the CSE did not produce the ordinary contemporaneous communications one would expect to exist if such a significant determination had genuinely been made on that date: no decision email, no internal recommendation, no exchange among the responsible officials, no instruction memorializing the outcome, and no contemporaneous notice to me.

This absence is especially striking because the CSE produced other internal emails when those emails supported its position, including communications concerning the assessment of my risk rating and my criticism of issuers. The CSE’s ability to produce selected internal correspondence, while producing no contemporaneous email establishing the actual suitability decision, is powerful circumstantial evidence requiring examination.

The evidence I attempted to introduce included material bearing on:

• whether the January 8 document was created or altered after the fact;
• the document’s metadata and revision history;
• the absence of contemporaneous decision emails;
• later-added and shifting explanations for the suitability determination;
• Mark Faulkner’s evidence and cross-examination;
• the CSE’s acknowledgment that no additional control-person disclosure was required;
• the CSE’s prior knowledge of the conduct it later characterized as promotional; and
• the use of criticism of issuers and the CSE as a later suitability rationale.

The Tribunal had authority to admit new evidence where the interests of justice and the public interest required it. The CSE Board also had the ability to receive additional material. Instead, both levels of review applied procedural restrictions in a manner that insulated the CSE’s own conduct from examination.

That was particularly unjust in circumstances where I became self-represented, the missing evidence was largely within the possession or control of the CSE and the OSC, the consequences extended to thousands of investors, and the material went directly to the reliability and integrity of the purported decision under review.

The double standard is unmistakable. Later social-media material was used against me to sustain an unsuitability finding, while later evidence offered by me to demonstrate possible CSE irregularity, shifting reasons, missing records, and procedural unfairness was excluded. The Tribunal permitted the evidentiary record to expand when doing so assisted the CSE, but closed the record when the evidence threatened to expose defects in the CSE’s case.

A deadline should not have been elevated above the truth where the Tribunal was dealing with a recognized exchange, a potentially unreliable decision record, approximately 4,000 affected investors, and millions of dollars in losses. The refusal to admit and examine this evidence will be a central ground of appeal.

3. THE CSE RELIED ON AN UNAPPROVED APPEAL REGIME

A further and fundamental defect concerns the CSE’s separate document entitled Procedures for Appeal of Staff Decisions to the Board of Directors.

The CSE’s regulator-approved Policy 1 established a right to appeal a staff decision to the CSE Board. However, the CSE did not administer my appeal under Policy 1 alone. It subjected me to a separate, detailed procedural code governing such matters as:

• the deadline for commencing an appeal;
• the content and timing of submissions;
• the material constituting the appeal record;
• the admission of evidence and calling of witnesses;
• the allocation of hearing time;
• the composition and quorum of the appeal panel;
• conflicts of interest;
• attendance at the hearing; and
• the provision of reasons and transcripts.

These are not clerical arrangements. They determine whether a person can exercise an appeal right, what evidence the Board will see, how the hearing will be conducted, and whether the appellant will receive a meaningful and fair review.

Yet the CSE identified no evidence that these Procedures had been approved by the CSE Board, filed with the Ontario Securities Commission or the British Columbia Securities Commission, classified under the applicable Rule Review Protocol, approved or reviewed by regulatory staff, or subjected to any applicable public-interest process. The evidence was that the Procedures were treated merely as an “internal” policy, with no identified regulatory approval.

That label does not answer the issue. Under the CSE’s Recognition Order and Rule Review Protocol, the definition of a “Rule” expressly includes a rule, policy, or other similar instrument. The substance and effect of the instrument—not the label selected by the CSE—must determine whether regulatory filing and review were required. Even a Rule properly classified as “housekeeping” is subject to Board approval, filing, classification, and regulatory review. A public-interest Rule is subject to still more extensive scrutiny and approval.

The CSE cannot obtain regulatory approval for an appeal right in Policy 1 and then privately construct a separate procedural code that materially restricts that right while avoiding the regulatory process applicable to its Rules. A recognized exchange cannot regulate by an unapproved internal instrument where that instrument determines substantive procedural rights and access to justice.

This was a threshold issue. Before relying upon, deferring to, or attempting to salvage the CSE Board’s decision, the Tribunal was required to determine:

1. whether the Procedures constituted a “Rule” within the Recognition Order’s broad definition;
2. when and by whom the Procedures were adopted;
3. whether the CSE Board or an authorized committee approved them;
4. whether they were submitted to the OSC and BCSC;
5. whether they were classified as housekeeping or public-interest Rules;
6. what regulatory review, approval, or non-objection they received; and
7. whether the CSE was legally entitled to impose them upon me.

The Tribunal did not resolve those questions in a legally adequate manner. Treating the Procedures as “internal” merely adopts the CSE’s characterization while ignoring their content, legal effect, and the express wording of the Recognition Order.

The defect was not theoretical. I was prejudiced by provisions governing deadlines, the evidentiary record, new evidence, submissions, hearing participation, witnesses, panel composition, conflicts, and the conduct of the appeal. Those restrictions materially affected my ability to challenge the suitability determination and place the complete record before the CSE Board.

At minimum, a Board appeal decision produced under a procedurally unauthorized regime could not lawfully attract deference. It should have been set aside. The Tribunal could not retroactively validate that process merely by substituting its own new rationale for the CSE’s deficient reasons—particularly while refusing to admit material evidence bearing directly upon the CSE’s conduct.

The combination of structural non-compliance and demonstrated prejudice required the Board decision to be quashed and the matter either remitted for a new appeal conducted under lawfully adopted and regulator-reviewed procedures or determined through a complete and procedurally fair hearing on the full evidentiary record. Combined with the lack of proper notice, the missing contemporaneous emails, the shifting reasons, and the failure to address evidence of CSE misconduct, it also supported setting aside the underlying suitability determination.

The Tribunal’s failure to confront this threshold defect will itself be an intended ground of appeal.

4. THE TRIBUNAL CREATED A NOVEL AND UNDEFINED SUITABILITY STANDARD

The Tribunal acknowledged that the CSE Board’s reasons did not clearly explain why it found me unsuitable and did not adequately address my fairness concerns. Rather than set aside the defective decision, the Tribunal conducted its own assessment and created a new rationale based principally on promotional posts concerning New World and posts critical of the CSE and its personnel.

The Tribunal identified no securities statute, regulation, CSE policy, trading rule, professional standard, or established suitability test that I violated by making the cited promotional statements. It did not find fraud, market manipulation, insider trading, a false filing, or a breach of a defined promotional rule. Instead, it converted its subjective view that statements were “inappropriate” into an indefinite finding of unsuitability.

“Inappropriate” is not a defined legal standard. Personal disapproval cannot substitute for law. A recognized exchange and a public tribunal cannot impose the practical equivalent of a market ban based upon an adjudicator’s feelings about tone or promotion without identifying an intelligible governing standard and applying it consistently.

Nor did the Tribunal undertake the securities analysis necessary to support its conclusion. It did not analyze each impugned statement against the information available when the statement was made. It did not assess the underlying company developments, explain why any particular statement was false or materially misleading, consider the disclosures accompanying the statements, or obtain expert evidence concerning securities research, valuation, investor relations, or accepted market communications.

There was no demonstrated CFA, securities-analysis, valuation, or promotional-compliance expertise before the panel and no independent expert was retained. The Tribunal nevertheless substituted its impression of promotional appropriateness for evidence and analysis. A tribunal cannot transform subjective displeasure into expert securities evidence.

The resulting sanction is also undefined in duration. The decision does not explain whether I am considered unsuitable temporarily, indefinitely, or permanently, what conduct could permit reconsideration, or what process exists for review. An open-ended restriction imposed through an undefined standard is incompatible with predictability, proportionality, and procedural fairness.

5. CRITICISM AND POLITICAL SPEECH WERE USED AS REGULATORY OFFENCES

The decision is especially troubling because it treats my criticism of the CSE, its personnel, and aspects of Canada’s regulatory and political system as evidence of unsuitability.

My criticism and the allegedly abusive or defamatory statements arose after the CSE halted New World and after investors suffered catastrophic losses. Those statements could not have caused an earlier suitability decision. They were a response—whether expressed forcefully or imperfectly—to regulatory action and perceived misconduct. The Tribunal nevertheless used that later speech to validate or replace a prior decision that had to stand or fall on the reasons and evidence existing when it was made.

There is an essential distinction between actual threats or unlawful conduct and harsh criticism of a regulator, an exchange, public officials, or a country’s policies. Political speech does not lose its character because officials find it offensive. Using criticism of Canada, Canadian institutions, or the CSE as a basis for excluding an American citizen from the capital markets raises grave freedom-of-expression, viewpoint-discrimination, territorial-jurisdiction, and anti-American-bias concerns.

The appearance is particularly serious in the current political environment. The decision effectively communicates that an American market participant may be punished not for violating a defined securities law, but for engaging in political discourse and criticizing Canadian regulatory institutions after those institutions harmed a public company and its investors.

The Tribunal should have required the CSE to establish a direct, legally defined connection between specific statements and a genuine capital-markets risk. It did not. It instead treated criticism of the regulator as evidence that the critic was unsuitable to participate in the market the regulator oversees. That reasoning is circular, dangerous, and fundamentally inconsistent with accountable government.

6. THE OSC’S TAXPAYER-FUNDED “MORAL SUPPORT” AND THE SIX-AGAINST-ONE HEARING

The physical presentation of the hearing created an additional and deeply troubling appearance of institutional pressure.

Charles “Charlie” Pettypiece attended with three senior OSC staff members who remained present for approximately three hearing days. Mr. Pettypiece described their role as providing “moral support.” In practical terms, four OSC representatives and two CSE/Norton Rose representatives were physically present in the hearing room while I appeared alone by Zoom as a self-represented litigant.

I had advised the Tribunal that fairness required comparable modes of participation. If I was required to appear remotely, the CSE and its counsel should not have been permitted to create an imposing in-person institutional presence. Instead, the Tribunal allowed a six-against-one visual and practical imbalance: six representatives of the regulatory establishment together in the room, with the self-represented appellant isolated on a screen.

Three senior OSC staff members were paid by Ontario taxpayers to sit in a hearing room for three days on what can fairly be described as a taxpayer-funded school trip providing “moral support” to the OSC’s position. Their presence was unnecessary to make legal submissions. The obvious appearance was that they were there to demonstrate institutional solidarity, reinforce the CSE’s position, and send a message about the weight of the regulatory establishment behind the respondents.

I do not suggest that physical attendance alone proves that any adjudicator was actually intimidated. The point is that a reasonable observer could perceive the arrangement as calculated to exert influence or create institutional pressure. The Tribunal was required to protect both actual fairness and its appearance. It instead permitted a profoundly uneven setting after being expressly warned of the problem.

The involvement of senior OSC personnel also raises questions about the extent of the OSC’s prior knowledge of and communications concerning the CSE process. Grant Vingoe, Charles Pettypiece, and relevant OSC officials appear to have known about the proceedings and the issues raised. The OSC’s refusal of access-to-information requests, including reliance upon ongoing legal proceedings, increases the need for independent disclosure of communications among the OSC, CSE, Norton Rose, and Tribunal-related personnel.

7. NORTON ROSE, OSC ACCESS, AND THE APPEARANCE OF REGULATORY CAPTURE

These concerns cannot be separated from the close professional and institutional relationships surrounding the case.

Norton Rose represented the CSE. Grant Vingoe was formerly a partner of Norton Rose before becoming Chair and Chief Executive Officer of the OSC. Published Canadian reporting has documented direct communications from Walied Soliman, then a senior Norton Rose partner and firm leader, to Mr. Vingoe and other senior OSC officials concerning a regulatory matter.

The reported communications do not, standing alone, establish that Mr. Soliman or Norton Rose influenced the outcome of my case. They do, however, demonstrate direct access at the highest level and support a legitimate concern that Norton Rose has the OSC’s ear in a manner unavailable to ordinary investors, issuers, and self-represented market participants.

That concern is amplified where:

• the CSE is represented by Norton Rose;
• a former Norton Rose partner leads the OSC;
• senior OSC staff attend the hearing in person for “moral support”;
• former OSC personnel occupy senior compliance and regulatory positions at the CSE;
• the OSC resists production of communications concerning the proceedings; and
• the Tribunal declines to examine evidence that could expose defects in the CSE’s process.

Each relationship may have an innocent explanation when considered in isolation. Taken together, they create an unmistakable appearance of an establishment protecting its own. That appearance requires independent investigation, documentary disclosure, and public answers—not institutional reassurance.

8. TRACEY STERN AND THE FAILURE OF EXCHANGE OVERSIGHT

The regulatory history makes the unapproved appeal regime even more troubling. The CSE publicly states that Tracey Stern, its Chief Legal Officer, General Counsel and Corporate Secretary, and her team are responsible for the CSE’s risk, legal, and compliance functions. Before joining the CSE, Ms. Stern spent more than two decades at the OSC, where she led the team responsible for market-structure policy and the regulation of exchanges and alternative trading systems.

The institutional responsibility therefore falls squarely within functions Ms. Stern previously led at the OSC and now leads at the CSE. She is uniquely positioned to understand that a recognized exchange cannot avoid regulatory scrutiny simply by characterizing a substantive procedural instrument as an “internal” policy.

The record calls for direct answers:

• When were the appeal Procedures created?
• Who drafted them?
• Who authorized their use?
• Were they ever approved by the CSE Board?
• Were they submitted to the OSC or BCSC?
• Did either regulator classify, review, approve, or object to them?
• If the CSE maintains that no filing was required, who reached that conclusion and on what legal basis?
• Why did the CSE continue to impose and defend the Procedures after the absence of an identifiable approval history was raised?

This was therefore not merely a historical regulatory omission. The problem was compounded when the CSE continued to rely upon the Procedures in my appeal and defended the resulting decision without producing evidence of their lawful adoption or regulatory review.

Given Ms. Stern’s senior responsibilities on both sides of this regulatory relationship, this issue warrants independent investigation by the Ontario Ministry of Finance, the Ontario Ombudsman, the applicable securities regulators, and the reviewing court. It is a concrete example of why movement of senior officials between a regulator and the regulated exchange creates serious concerns about accountability, institutional self-protection, and whether recognized exchanges are subjected to genuinely independent oversight.

9. THE TRIBUNAL’S SUBSTITUTED RATIONALE DID NOT CURE THE CSE’S DEFECTIVE PROCESS

The Tribunal found that the CSE Board’s reasons did not clearly explain why I was unsuitable and did not adequately address the fairness concerns I raised. That should have led to the CSE decision being set aside.

Instead, the Tribunal attempted to cure the defects by conducting its own assessment and constructing a new suitability rationale. That approach compounded the unfairness:

• it allowed the CSE to benefit from inadequate reasons;
• it insulated the original decision-making process from effective review;
• it relied on conduct and explanations developed after the original decision;
• it excluded evidence offered to expose weaknesses in the CSE record;
• it applied an undefined standard not identified by the CSE when it acted; and
• it left the original cause of the trading halt and investor losses unresolved.

A reviewing tribunal should not rescue a defective exchange decision by inventing a different basis that the exchange itself did not adequately articulate. Doing so deprives the appellant of notice and a meaningful opportunity to answer the case actually being decided.

10. INTENDED ONTARIO COMPLAINTS AND REQUESTS FOR INVESTIGATION

I intend to submit or supplement formal complaints and investigation requests to the Ontario Ministry of Finance, the Ontario Ombudsman, the OSC, the BCSC, and other appropriate oversight bodies.

Those requests will seek, among other things:

• an investigation into the creation, approval status, and use of the CSE appeal Procedures;
• production of the contemporaneous emails and records underlying the purported suitability determination;
• examination of communications among the CSE, OSC, Norton Rose, and relevant officials;
• review of the OSC staff presence at the hearing and the use of public resources for “moral support”;
• investigation of conflicts and revolving-door relationships;
• review of the CSE’s shifting rationales and selective production of evidence;
• an assessment of the losses suffered by New World and approximately 4,000 shareholders; and
• recommendations to prevent a recognized exchange from imposing comparable harm without timely independent review.

These are lawful oversight requests concerning the exercise of public and quasi-public regulatory power. They are not personal threats against any individual.

11. REQUESTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS AND GOVERNMENT

Because I am an American citizen, the overwhelming majority of my audience is in the United States, New World securities traded in the United States, and American investors may purchase securities of Canadian junior issuers through U.S. markets, these events also raise legitimate United States investor-protection and trade concerns.

I intend to provide the record to relevant members and committees of the United States Congress and to request examination of the regulatory asymmetry affecting Canadian junior issuers accessing American capital and American investors accessing Canadian-listed securities.

The central problem is not that Canadian issuers have no access to the United States. It is that cross-border access is not matched by equivalent, practically enforceable protection when a Canadian exchange halts an issuer, reverses prior approvals, imposes an undefined suitability restriction, or uses an unapproved internal appeal regime. American investors can suffer the economic consequences while having little effective recourse against the Canadian exchange or its regulators.

Congressional and federal requests may include consideration of:

• hearings concerning the treatment of American investors and market participants by Canadian junior exchanges;
• a Government Accountability Office or congressional study of investor losses associated with CSE and TSX Venture issuers trading in the United States;
• enhanced disclosure by Canadian junior issuers concerning Canadian trading halts, exchange suitability disputes, regulatory investigations, management restrictions, and unresolved exchange appeals;
• prompt Form 6-K or comparable disclosure obligations when a Canadian exchange takes action capable of materially impairing U.S. trading or investor value;
• review by the Securities and Exchange Commission of exemptions, accommodations, quotation eligibility, and disclosure treatment available to Canadian foreign private issuers;
• additional broker-dealer and OTC-market warnings concerning the limits of U.S. investor remedies against Canadian exchanges;
• conditions on continued U.S. market access where the home-country exchange does not provide transparent, regulator-approved, and independent appeal procedures;
• examination by the Office of the United States Trade Representative of whether discriminatory or non-transparent Canadian regulatory conduct burdens American market participants or cross-border financial services;
• consideration of proportionate trade or regulatory responses if systemic discrimination or denial of reciprocal investor protection is established; and
• direct congressional inquiries to Canadian federal and Ontario officials concerning the treatment of New World’s investors and the use of political speech as a suitability factor.

Congress also has the ability to request records and explanations from U.S. agencies, hold public hearings, ask the SEC to review cross-border exemptions and disclosures, request a GAO investigation, and consider legislation conditioning market access upon reciprocal investor protections.

I will ask Congress and the relevant agencies to determine what measures are justified by the evidence. I am not representing that sanctions, tariffs, or market restrictions are automatic or predetermined. The point is that these lawful governmental remedies exist and should be evaluated where Canadian regulatory conduct injures American investors or discriminates against American speech and participation.

12. STATE DEPARTMENT REVIEW OF FREEDOM-OF-EXPRESSION CONCERNS

I also intend to submit a complaint to Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s office and the appropriate United States Department of State officials concerning the use of protected American political speech and criticism of foreign institutions as grounds for regulatory exclusion.

The United States has publicly announced policies allowing visa restrictions and other measures to be considered against foreign persons responsible for serious censorship of Americans or suppression of protected expression, including measures involving certain foreign officials and judges.

My submission will ask the State Department to review the conduct of all persons materially associated with this matter—including exchange personnel, regulatory officials, counsel, and any judicial or adjudicative officials whose orders or decisions are alleged to penalize protected American speech—and determine independently whether any existing United States policy or legal authority applies.

This is not a threat that any identified person will be barred from the United States. Visa and entry determinations belong exclusively to the United States government. It is notice that documented complaints will be filed through lawful channels and that the United States government will be asked to assess whether foreign officials or associated persons used regulatory or judicial power to suppress an American citizen’s political expression.

The complaint will distinguish criticism and political discourse from genuine unlawful threats or conduct. It will include the relevant decisions, transcripts, posts, chronology, and evidence so that U.S. officials can evaluate the matter on a complete record.

13. NOTICE TO THE PRESS, INVESTORS, AND ELECTED OFFICIALS

The approximately 4,000 New World shareholders are entitled to know why their investment was halted, why the CSE reversed course after approving the transaction, what evidence existed when the suitability determination was allegedly made, and why no contemporaneous decision emails have been produced.

I intend to notify Canadian and U.S. media of the Tribunal decision, the intended appeal, the unapproved-procedures issue, the missing-email issue, the OSC’s attendance, the institutional relationships described above, and the resulting investor losses.

New World investors will be provided with a factual chronology and relevant public documents. They will also be advised of their right to contact their elected representatives, the Ontario Ministry of Finance, the Ontario Ombudsman, securities regulators, members of Parliament and the Ontario Legislature, and—where applicable—members of the United States Congress.

This investor outreach will not direct anyone to make a false or abusive complaint. Investors will be asked to describe their own losses and request lawful oversight, disclosure, and accountability from their elected officials.

14. PRESERVATION OF THE COMPLETE RECORD

Given the intended appeal and parallel oversight complaints, all parties and relevant institutions should preserve the complete record, including:

• emails, text messages, Teams or other internal messages;
• drafts and metadata relating to the January 8 document and subsequent revisions;
• communications concerning my suitability, New World, Dial MKT Corp., and the trading halt;
• communications among the CSE, OSC, BCSC, Norton Rose, Tribunal personnel, and CSE Board members;
• records concerning the creation, adoption, approval, classification, and use of the appeal Procedures;
• calendar entries, attendance records, internal instructions, and communications concerning OSC personnel attending the hearing;
• audio recordings, transcripts, notes, and materials relating to the CSE Board appeal; and
• communications concerning access-to-information requests and the decision to withhold responsive records.

No relevant record, metadata, message, or draft should be deleted, altered, overwritten, or permitted to expire under an ordinary retention schedule.

15. CONCLUSION

The decision leaves a recognized exchange free to approve a transaction, permit investors to rely upon that approval, reverse course after closing, halt the issuer, rely upon a disputed and incomplete decision record, use an unapproved internal appeal regime, and then obtain a new rationale from the Tribunal after its own reasons were found inadequate.

It leaves approximately 4,000 investors with devastating losses and no meaningful explanation. It transforms promotional judgment and criticism of Canadian institutions into an undefined suitability offence without identifying a violated law. It excludes evidence capable of exposing regulatory wrongdoing while relying on later evidence against the appellant. It tolerates a six-against-one hearing environment supported by taxpayer-funded “moral support.” And it raises serious questions about regulatory capture, revolving-door relationships, viewpoint discrimination, and the protection afforded to American investors and speakers.

That result cannot be reconciled with procedural fairness, transparent regulation, or the public interest. It should not stand.

I will therefore seek appellate relief and will provide the record to the appropriate Canadian and United States oversight bodies, elected officials, investors, and media. Every step will be pursued through lawful processes, supported by the documentary record, and directed toward accountability and protection of the investing public.

Sincerely,

Jack Marks
Applicant, self-represented
[Email]
[Telephone]

cc: Counsel for CNSX Markets Inc.
cc: Ontario Securities Commission
cc: Registrar, Capital Markets Tribunal